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Article 9

Case Comments
GOVERNMENT, TWO

-

INDIANS, ONE

By ANTHONY JORDAN*
Three recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have a significant
effect upon the rights of some Canadian Indians to pursue their livelihood by
fishing and hunting for food.' The judgments, in particular Kruger and Manuel
v. The Queen and Derriksan v. The Queen, have a significance that goes far
beyond the particular issues presented by their facts. Both judgments represent an approach that the Supreme Court of Canada has taken to resolving
Indian rights cases, and further entrench some general principles affecting
native rights.
Frank v. The Queen
Alex Frank was a registered Indian whose ancestors were signatories of
Treaty #6, made in 1876 between the Queen and the Plain and Wood Cree
tribes of Alberta and Saskatchewan. Frank lived on a reserve located within
the area ceded by Treaty #6 in Saskatchewan, and was charged with an offence under the Wildlife Act 2 of Alberta while hunting in the Treaty #6 area
of Alberta. It was agreed that at the time he was hunting for food on lands
to which the Indians "have a right of access," as that expression is used in
the Alberta Natural Resources Agreement. 3
Frank raised two defences against the charge: his rights under Treaty
#6 and his rights under the Alberta Natural Resources Agreement. Treaty
#6 provides, in part, as follows:
Her Majesty further agrees with her said Indians that they, the said Indians, shall
have right to pursue their avocations of hunting and fishing throughout the
tract surrendered as hereinbefore described, subject to such regulations as may
from time to time be made by her Government of Her Dominion of Canada, and

@Copyright, 1978, Anthony Jordan.
* Mr. Jordan is Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
and Research Director, Native Law Centre, Saskatoon.
I Derriksan v. The Queen (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159, [1976] 6 W.W.R. 480
(S.C.C.), afl'g (1975), 60 D.L.R. (3d) 140 (B.C.C.A.), aflg (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d)
744 (B.C.S.C.); Frank v. The Queen (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 481, [1977] 4 W.W.R.
294 (S.C.C.), rev'g (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 327 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.); and Kruger
and Manuel v. The Queen (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 434, [1977] 4 W.W.R. 300 (S.C.C.),
aff'g (1975), 60 D.L.R. (3d) 144 (B.C.C.A.), which reversed (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d)
435 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
2 R.S.A. 1970, c. 391, s. 16.
3British North America Act, 1930, R.S.C. 1970, App. I, no. 25.
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saving and excepting such tracts as may from time to time be required or taken
up for settlement, mining, lumbering or other purposes by her said Government of
the Dominion of Canada or by any of the subjects thereof duly authorized therefor
by the said Government.

The argument based upon the treaty was disposed of by the Alberta
Court of Appeal with reference to section 88 of the Indian Act.4
88. Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of
Canada, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province
are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent
that such laws are inconsistent with this Act or any other order, rule, regulation
or by-law made thereunder, and except to the extent that such laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under this Act.

The Alberta Court of Appeal took this to mean that Frank's treaty rights
would be immune from provincial legislation were it not for the existence of
an "other Act of the Parliament of Canada," that is, the Alberta Natural Resources Act. 5 Each of the Natural Resources Agreements contains a provision
concerning Indian hunting rights; in the Alberta Agreement, paragraph 12
states:
12. In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply
of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws
respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the
Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians
shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied
Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said Indians may have a right

of access.

Without directly accepting the reasoning of the Alberta Court of Appeal,
Dickson J., writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, dealt with the case on the
basis that the treaty rights were no longer relevant because of the Natural
Resources Agreement, and focused his attention solely on the interpretation
of that Agreement.
The question for the Court was whether the words in paragraph 12 of
the Agreement, "the said Indians," referring to those who would have the
right of hunting for food, relate back to the words "Indians of the Province,"
whose supply of game and fish is to be secured, or relate to the expression,
"the Indians within the boundaries thereof," which may or may not include
non-resident Indians within the province from time to time. The Alberta
Court of Appeal had decided that it was only "the Indians of the Province"
whose right to hunt and fish for food was assured to them, and that expression meant Indians normally resident within the province. The effect of this
judgment was to make all other Indians hunting within the Province of
Alberta subject to Alberta game laws, regardless of any right they may have
had under a treaty.
The various possible interpretations of paragraph 12 of the Alberta

4 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
5 The Agreement was ratified by Alberta, S.A. 1930, c. 21; Canada, S.C. 1930, c. 3;
and the Imperial Parliament, British North America Act, 1930, supra note 3.
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Natural Resources Agreement presented a number of practical alternatives.
First, acceptance of the position of the Alberta Court of Appeal would mean
the abrogation of treaty rights for Indians to the extent that their treaty area
extended beyond the boundaries of the province in which they live. This
would have the most significant impact for Treaty #6 Indians, whose treaty
area extends across central Alberta and Saskatchewan from the border of
British Columbia almost to the Manitoba border. In effect, the area over
which they would be free to hunt, pursuant to their treaty, would be cut in
half. Other Indians who could be affected are as follows: Treaty #4 Indians
whose area is predominately in Saskatchewan but extends slightly into Manitoba and into Alberta; the members of the Blackfoot Confederacy whose
Treaty #7 extends slightly into Saskatchewan; the signatories of Treaty #2
whose treaty area is largely within Manitoba but extends into Saskatchewan;
Treaty #3 which is predominately in Ontario but extends into Manitoba; and
Treaty #8 which extends over northern Alberta, northwestern British Columbia and a part of the lower Great Slave Lake area of the Northwest Territories. In effect, the freedom of movement of western Indians for purposes of
hunting would, in many cases, be greatly restricted.
Secondly, it is possible to construe the words "shall apply to the Indians
within the boundaries thereof" as meaning that provincial game laws should
apply only to Indians resident in the province. Presumably, provincial laws
would also apply to non-resident Indians by virtue of section 88 of the Indian
Act, subject, of course, to any treaty rights. The practical effect of this would
be, in some senses, the reverse of the first interpretation. For example, the
Treaty #6 Indian living in Alberta would be restricted to hunting for food
on unoccupied Crown lands or lands to which he had a right of access, while
a Treaty #6 Indian from Saskatchewan would be allowed to hunt in Alberta
for any purpose in all areas except those taken up for settlement, mining,
lumbering or other purposes.
The third alternative, that chosen by the Supreme Court, and the one
that on its face appears to be the most desirable, would be to extend the
application of provincial laws to all Indians hunting in the province from
time to time, and, at the same time, extend to all Indians hunting in the
province the right to hunt and fish for food. The practical effect of this is
simply that a Treaty #6 Indian hunting in either Alberta or Saskatchewan
and resident in either province would have the same rights as any other
Treaty #6 Indian. While abrogating in part the treaty rights of all the
prairie Indians, this approach has the simple virtue of at least abrogating
them uniformly. It does not have the effect of imposing upon Indians
the artificial provincial boundaries established after the treaties were entered into.
It does, however, affect other rights that, for the Indians of the prairies, are very real. It allows not only a Treaty #6 Indian to hunt throughout the whole of the tract land surrendered by his people, but also a Blackfoot
who enjoys the benefit of Treaty #7 may hunt there, as may a Micmac
from Nova Scotia or a Mohawk from Ontario. These interlopers enjoy
not only the privileges of hunting extended to all citizens of Canada by the
various provincial game acts, but also the right to harvest game for food
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in an area with which they have no traditional connection. This result was
considered by the Alberta Court of Appeal and rejected as seeming to defeat
the whole purpose of the legislation, i.e., securing a supply of game to the
Indians of the province. Neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court
of Canada considered the problem in relation to traditional hunting areas.0
Given the choices, available and the agreed upon facts that Frank
was hunting for food in an area to which he had right of access, it was only
necessary for him to be able to call in aid either his treaty rights or the
provisions of the Natural Resources Agreement. Mr. Justice Dickson settled the question with regard to the Natural Resources Agreement by
applying basic rules of grammar without reference to policy considerations:
I do not think "Indians of the Province" and "Indians within the boundaries thereof" refer to the same group. The use of different language suggests different groups.
In my view, "Indians of the Province" means Alberta Indians. The words, "Indians
within the boundaries", on the other hand, refer to a larger group, namely, Indians
who, at any particular moment, happen to be found within the boundaries of the
Province of Alberta, irrespective of normal residence. All persons forming part of
this latter group are subject to the game laws in force at any given time in that
Province but with the right of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food
at all seasons of the year on unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to
which the Indians may have a right of access. The words "Indians within the boundaries" mean all Indians within the boundaries of Alberta, and not just some of
the Indians within such boundaries.
One of the rules of grammar one learns at an early age is that a relative should
refer to the last antecedent. Such rule, of course, must yield if the result makes
nonsense but I find no such result when one relates back the relative "the said
Indians" to the last antecedent, "Indians within the boundaries". There is no need
to place the7 clause of reference out of juxtaposition by jumping over the nearest
antecedent.

That interpretation not only protects Frank in relation to this charge; it
necessarily means that the right to hunt in Alberta given by treaty to
Indians resident outside Alberta has been effectively altered. Dickson J. specifically rejected the proposition that
... s. 12 was ever intended to place Indians resident in Alberta in a position of
advantage, or of disadvantage, vis-h-vis Indians 8normally resident elsewhere, or to
fragment treaty areas by provincial boundaries.

Nevertheless, the imposition of provincial boundaries upon treaty areas
is precisely what has happened as a result of the Frank judgment. All
Indians within the prairie provinces are subjected to whatever provincial
laws are in force from time to time in the area in which they are hunting,
regardless of treaty, and all Indians have an equal right to hunt anywhere
within the prairie provinces for food on unoccupied Crown land or lands
to which they have a right of access, again, with no reference to their traditional hunting grounds or their treaty area.
6 The problem of tribes infringing upon each others hunting areas is not one that
the Federal Government has ever attempted to deal with. After the Treaties were signed
on the prairies and the buffalo virtually disappeared, the problem became more acute,
but no attempt was made to avoid friction by restricting the various tribes to their treaty
areas. See H. Dempsey, Crowfoot (Edmonton: Hurtig Pub., 1972) at chap. 10.
7 Supra note 1, at 485 (D.L.R.), 298-99 (W.W.R.).
8Id. at 486 (D.L.R.), 299 (W.W.R.).
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This brief acknowledgement of the importance of treaty rights is a
noble gesture, but only a gesture. While the Court looked to treaty rights
for some moral support, the approach taken by Dickson J. would lead to
the same result regardless of any treaties. Indian hunting rights in the prairie provinces are viewed by the Supreme Court as depending only upon the
terms of the Natural Resources Agreement. No consideration is given to
the question whether those rights have their source in treaty or in any
policy of the law towards aboriginal peoples. 9
Derriksan v. The Queen
Circumstances of the Frank case were such that the Supreme Court
could, and did, avoid any discussion of the nature or source of Indian
hunting and fishing rights. The Derriksan and Kruger and Manuel cases
forced the Court to give some consideration to the nature of aboriginal
rights and the extent to which they may be abrogated by the federal and
provincial governments. In spite of this, the following discussion will demonstrate how the Supreme Court managed to avoid any significant discussion of these issues and, in the process, determined the questions in a
manner adverse, not only to the individuals involved in the two cases, but
to all Canadian Indians who seek to claim aboriginal rights.
The Derriksan case stands as simply another affirmation of the power
of the federal government to abrogate aboriginal rights by legislative enactment, either directly or indirectly. Derriksan was a non-treaty Indian
registered under the Indian Act, who was charged with a number of offences
under the British Columbia Fishery Regulations,'° made pursuant to the
Fisheries Act." The offences were committed while he was fishing for food
in the tradional fishing grounds of his band.
In a terse one paragraph judgment, Chief Justice Laskin disposed of
the appeal by Derriksan from the judgment of the British Columbia Court
of Appeal with the forceful, if unsupported, statement that, assuming that
there is an aboriginal right to fish in that particular area, the right is subjected
to the controls imposed by the FisheriesAct and the regulations made under it.
Expressing itself in this way, rather than simply adopting the reasoning of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court seems to foreclose any possibility of arguing that there is some limit to the power of the
federal government to abrogate aboriginal rights unilaterally and without
compensation. This is not to say that the terms of the judgment itself eliminate all hope that future claims of aboriginal rights might stand in the
face of a federal enactment not directly related to aboriginal rights; rather,
it is the summary manner of the Court's approach and its disinclination

9 For an excellent discussion of the Frank case in the context of aboriginal rights,
see B. Bilson, Aboriginal Hunting Rights: Some Issues Raised by the Case of R. v. Frank
(1976-77), 41 Sask. L. Rev. 101.
10 P.C. 1954-1910, S.O.R. Cons./55, Vol. 2, 1629, amended S.O.R./68-273, s. 6.

11 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14.
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to search for a solution that avoids, to paraphrase Cartwright J.,02 a
failure to uphold the honour of the Sovereign and prevents Parliament
from being subject to the reproach of having taken away rights by unilateral
action.
The final result of the judgment is not surprising in view of the previous decisions of the courts in relation to the application of federal fish
and game laws to Indians. In R. v. Sikyea,'3 the Court had decided that
rights to hunt preserved by treaty were subject to the provisions of the
Migratory Birds Convention Act.' 4 A short time later, it extended this
proposition to the situation not only where the rights were protected by
treaty, but also where the hunting prohibited by the Migratory Birds Convention Act had taken place on lands set aside as an Indian reserve. 5 In spite of
what appeared to be a constitutional guarantee of the right to hunt, trap and
fish for food in the prairie provinces, the Supreme Court determined in 1968
that the British North America Act, 193016 protected Indian huning rights
from infringement by the provinces only, and not the federal government.' 7
It is not surprising, then, that when the Supreme Court has made so little
effort to protect rights of Indians guaranteed by solemn treaties it should
not go out of its way to protect rights arising solely by virtue of use and
occupation of the land by its aboriginal inhabitants.
The possibility existed for the Supreme Court to seek an honourable
solution to the problem. None of the previous decisions of the Supreme
Court had dealt directly with the abrogation of aboriginal hunting rights
by the federal government. The case that came nearest to dealing with
the issue, Sigeareak El-53 v. The Queen,'8 held that Eskimos (Indians
within the meaning of the word in the British North America Act, 186719)
were subject to game legislation of the Northwest Territories passed pursuant to the Northwest Territories Act.20 That case was easily distinguishable in that the Northwest Territories Act made specific reference to the
application of Territorial game laws to Eskimos, subject to their right to
hunt and fish unendangered species at all seasons of the year for food.
While the Fisheries Regulations make specific reference to Indians, the
FisheriesAct does not. It would thus have been open to the Court to construe the legislation as not being intended to remove vested rights that
would appear, from the discussion of aboriginal rights in Calder v. A.-G.
12 R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386 at 396-97. Cartwright J., as he
was then, protested against an interpretation of s. 87 of the Indian Act (now s. 88) that
resulted in the derogation of hunting rights secured to Indians by treaty when an alternative interpretation was possible.
13 [1964] S.C.R. 642, D.L.R. (2d) 80, [1965] 2 C.C.C. 129.
'4 R.S.C. 1970, c. M-12.
'5 R. v. George, supra note 12.
'6 Supra note 3.
'7 Daniels v. The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 517, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [1969] 1 C.C.C. 299.
18 (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 536 (S.C.C.).
19
Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 417.
2
0 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-22.
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B.C.,-2 to be something more than simply the right to continue acting in
a way that is not declared unlawful.
The Court has been invited in the past, on occasion by its own members,2 2 to construe legislation so as to avoid taking away Indian hunting
rights without specific words by Parliament to that effect. That approach
has invariably been rejected. There is in this case, however, some support,
outside of a mere desire to see justice done, for the proposition that the
Fisheries Act ought to have been construed in precisely that manner. By
the Terms of Union under which British Columbia became a part of this
country, the federal government agreed, in part, as follows:
The charge of the Indians, and the trusteeship and management of the lands
reserved for their use and benefit, shall be assumed by the Dominion Government,
and a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by the British Columbia Government shall be continued by the Dominion Government after the Union.
To carry out such policy, tracts of land of such extent as it has hitherto been the
practice of the British Columbia Government to appropriate for that purpose,
shall from time to time be conveyed by the Local Government to the Dominion
Government in trust for the use and benefit of the Indians on application of the
Dominion Government; and in case of disagreement between the two Governments
respecting the quantity of such tracts of land to be so granted, the matter
shall be
23
referred for the decision of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

This paragraph would seem to contemplate that the federal government

recognized, in 1871, an obligation to settle the aboriginal claims of the
Indians of British Columbia. That obligation is not simply a moral one; it
is one of the terms and conditions prescribed by the Order-in-Council of
May 16, 1871 passed pursuant to section 146 of the British North America
Act, 1867.24 It would conceivably be open to the Supreme Court to hold
that, in the absence of some evidence that the colony of British Columbia
inadvertently and without compensation terminated the aboriginal rights of
the Indians, the Parliament of Canada, at the very least, should not be
taken to have done so unless the legislation alleged to have that effect can
be interpreted in no other way. To press the point, it may be possible for
the Supreme Court of Canada to hold that it is beyond the power of the
Government of Canada to extinguish the aboriginal rights of British Columbia Indians without taking at least those steps that would have been taken
by the colony of British Columbia before 1871, though it was not necessary
to go that far in this case.
Such a determination would, however, force upon the Supreme Court
the difficult task of making a number of other decisions. It could not, as it
did in this case, assume the existence of an aboriginal right. Clearly, it
would have to find the existence of an aboriginal right and define the
nature of that right, at least to the extent of determining whether the accused's conduct fell within the legitimate exercise of it. These are questions
21 [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1.
R. v. George, supra note 12 (Cartwright J.); and Daniels v. The Queen, supra
note 17 (Hall and Cartwright JJ.).
23 R.S.C. 1970, App. II, no. 10.
24 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
22
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which the Court has made clear in Kruger and Manuel v. The Queen that
it does not want to deal with, and questions that it seems prepared to go
to great lengths to avoid.
Kruger and Manuel v. The Queen
The last of the three cases is somewhat of a companion piece to
Derriksan v. The Queen and demonstrates the questions that the Court
would have had to face had it chosen the alternative outlined above. While
Derriksan dealt with federal regulation of fishing for non-treaty Indians,
and Frank with provincial regulation of hunting for treaty Indians in
the prairie provinces, Kruger and Manuel deals with provincial regulation of hunting for non-treaty Indians in British Columbia. Kruger and
Manuel were in virtually the same position as Noll Derriksan. As non-treaty
Indians hunting outside the reservation for food in the traditional hunting
area of the Penticton Indian Band, of which they were members, they were
convicted of killing big game during the closed season under section 5(1) (c)
of the Wildlife Act25 of British Columbia.
Kruger and Manuel argued that the British Columbia Court of Appeal
had erred on three separate points:
1. In ruling that the Wildlife Act was a law of general application within the
meaning of that phrase in section 88 of the Indian Act;
2. In ruling, in effect, that section 88 of the Indian Act constituted a federal incorporation by reference of certain provincial laws rather than a statement of
the general principles relating to the application of provincial laws to Indians; and
3. In ruling, in effect, that aboriginal hunting rights could be expropriated without
compensation and without explicit federal legislation

In disposing of these arguments, Dickson J., again speaking for a
unanimous court, took great pains to avoid reaching a decision on the
second and third arguments and, in the process, produced some rather surprising propositions concerning the status of aboriginal rights and the ability
of a province to abrogate them.
The argument for the Province of British Columbia revolved around
section 88 of the Indian Act. The Crown's argument was simply that the
Wildlife Act is a law of general application, it did not conflict with the
Indian Act, and it does not conflict with any treaty. Thus, by virtue of section 88 of the Indian Act, it applies to Indians. The counter argument
would be to the following effect: the Wildlife Act is not a law of general
application as it applies to Indians because it affects a vested proprietary
right not enjoyed by other citizens of British Columbia, or, in the alternative, if it is a law of general application, it is ultra vires the Province of
British Columbia insofar as it relates to Indians because it abrogates aboriginal rights. Accordingly, it could only have effect to do so if it has
been given the force of a federal law by being incorporated into the Indian
Act by section 88. Even if that is the case, it would still not be effective to
abrogate aboriginal rights as that ought not to be considered to have been
done without compensation in the absence of explicit federal legislation.
25 S.B.C. 1966, c. 55, as amended 1971, c. 69, ss. 3 and 4.
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In the context of these arguments, in order to find for the Indians it
would be necessary to determine: that hunting is included within aboriginal
rights; that the Penticton Band of Indians enjoy aboriginal rights over the
area where the accused were hunting; that a province cannot abrogate aboriginal rights; and, finally, that the federal government had not done so
by incorporating provincial legislation in the Indian Act.
Dealing with these issues, Dickson J. made a number of statements
that are worthy of comment. In an attempt to avoid dealing with the subject
of aboriginal rights, the Court enunciated two questionable propositions
about the nature of aboriginal rights and their enforceability. As in Derriksan and Frank,the Court considered the extent of Indian hunting rights without ever considering why Indians have, or might have, hunting rights different
from those of other Canadian citizens. In Frank, it treated the rights as
simply arising from a treaty or statute, with no reference to the history of
those rights or the effects that treaties and statutes have had upon them.
In Kruger and Manuel, the Court seemed to proceed on the assumption that
Indians do not have hunting rights beyond those of the ordinary citizen
unless they are enshrined in a treaty or statute. No reference was made to
comments such as those of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Frank:
Section 91 of the B.N.A. Act, 1867, listed among the things and matters exclusively
assigned to the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada [para. 24]:
24. Indians and lands reserved for the Indians.
and it appears that prior to the enactment in 1951, of what is now section 88 of
the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, provincial laws and Regulations with respect
to the hunting and fishing rights of the Indians were treated as ultra vires or in-

applicable to Indians.28

No consideration was given to the judgment of MacKeigan C.J. in R. v.
Isaac27 to the effect that provincial game legislation in Nova Scotia cannot
apply to an Indian hunting on a reserve:
...a provincial law is excluded from operation if it deals with an Indian qua
Indian, or with Indian reserve land qua land, or perhaps, more accurately, if it is
"legislation in relation to Indian status or Indian land rights" (Ritchie, J., in the
Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare et al.) ... 2s
Further in his judgment, MacKeigan C.1. discussed the nature of aboriginal rights as follows:
That right, sometimes called "Indian title" is an interest in land akin to a profit a
prendre. It arose long before 1867 but has not been extinguished as to reserve land
and, being still an incident of the reserve land, can be controlled or regulated
only by the federal government. This stresses legalistically the perhaps self-evident
proposition that hunting by an Indian is traditionally so much a part of his use
of his land and its resources as to be for him, peculiarly and specially, integral
9
to that land.2

No cases were cited by Dickson J. to support the proposition that, prior
to the enactment of section 88 of the Indian Act, provincial game laws
2

GSupra note 1, at 332 (D.L.R.).

27

(1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (N.S.C.A.).

28 Id. at 468.
29 Id. at 469.
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applied to Indians hunting off a reserve in their traditional hunting areas.
There is ample authority for the proposition that provincial game laws did
not apply to Indians hunting on reserves prior to the enactment of section
88 or in the absence of the Natural Resources Agreement entered into by
the prairie provinces: R. v. Jim; 0 R. v. Rogers.8 1 Nevertheless, Dickson J.
cited dicta by Martland J. in Cardinalv. The Attorney-General of Alberta,8 2
a case that dealt with the application of provincial game laws to a reserve
by virtue of the Alberta Natural Resources Agreement, and R. v. George,88
which dealt with the application of federal regulations to Indians on the
prairies to support the proposition:
Provincial game laws, which have as their object the conservation and management of provincial wildlife resources, have been held by this court not to relate
to Indians qua Indians. . . .It was long ago decided that provincial laws may
affect Indians, insofar as the Act was not in relation to them.34

Dickson J. practically avoided any discussion of the nature and extent of
aboriginal rights by the comment:
The Wildlife Act illustrates the point. It is aimed at wildlife management and to
that end it regulates the time, place and manner of hunting game. It is not directed
to the acquisition of property. 5

It is difficult to conceive what aboriginal rights of Indians entail if they do not
entail the right to hunt and fish, at least to maintain one's livelihood. The
courts of this country have never embarked upon any definition of the nature
or scope of aboriginal rights other than casual comments inserted into discussions relating to the existence of those rights. MacKeigan C.J. appears to have
come closest to discussing the rights to hunt by referring to aboriginal rights
as "a profit," which is, under our system of land holding, more than a mere
license and constitutes an interest in lands.
The Privy Council in St. CatharinesLumber and Milling Co. v. The
Queen38 described aboriginal title as a "usufructory right." The discussions
by Judson J.(Martland and Ritchie JJ. concurring) and Hall J. (Spence and
Laskin IJ.concurring) in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia3 7
made it clear that aboriginal title, where it exists, is an interest in land. At one
point, Hall J.8 referred to the judgment of Johnson J.A. of the Northwest
Territories Court of Appeal in R. v. Sikyea (whose reasons were adopted by
the Supreme Court of Canada 9 ), where he said:
The right of Indians to hunt and fish for food on unoccupied Crown lands has
always been recognized in Canada-in the early days as an incident of their

30 (1915), 26 C.C.C. 236 (B.C.S.C.).
81 (1923), 40 C.C.C. 51 (Man. C.A.).
32 [1974] S.C.R. 695, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 553, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 1.
33Supra note 12.

s4 Supra note 1, at 438-39 (D.L.R.), 304-05 (W.W.R.).
35 1d. at 437 (D.L.R.), 303 (W.W.R.).
36 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46.
87 Supra note 21.
88

Id. at 397 (S.C.R.), 205 (D.L.R.), 67 (W.W.R.).

39 Supra note 13.
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"ownership" of the land, and later by the treaties by which the Indians gave up

their ownership right in these lands ....40

Judson J. in the Calder case, spoke of aboriginal title in the following
terms:
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia cannot owe
its origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the
Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their fore-

fathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does not
help one in the solution of this problem to call it a "personal or usufructory right".
What they are asserting in this action is that they had a right to continue to live
on their lands as their forefathers had lived and that his right has never been
lawfully extinguished. ....41

The Calder case proceeded on the assumption that after British Columbia
entered into Confederation in 1871 it could no longer extinguish the aboriginal rights of Indians, that power being reserved by the B.N.A. Act, 1867
and the terms of union with British Columbia exclusively to the federal government. 42 It would follow that if the right to hunt on traditional hunting
grounds is an incident of aboriginal title, it could not be extinguished by
provincial legislation alone. Acceptance of that proposition would open
up the issue of whether or not section 88 of the Indian Act simply declares
the state of law with regard to the application of provincial laws to Indians,
or incorporates the laws of general application into the Indian Act, thus giving
them the force of a federal enactment in relation to Indians.
The characterization of game laws as having no reference to proprietary
rights is not only unsupported by any previous case dealing with Indian hunting rights (save, perhaps, Cardinal v. the Attorney-General of Alberta4 3),
but it would seem to be in conflict with English and Canadian common law
dealing with the right to acquire wild animals. Students in first year law school
personal property courses will be surprised to hear that the owner of land
has no right to wild animals on the land vis-a-vis strangers:Bladesv. Higgs.44
The property aspects of game legislation are recognized in some provincesfor example, by the Game Act45 of Saskatchewan, which declares all wild
game within the province to be vested in the Crown in right of Saskatchewan.
No similar section appears in the British Columbia legislation, but this does
not mean that the same rules of the common law do not extend to that province.
These remarks have not been an exhaustive discussion of the nature of
proprietary rights of wild animals, or the source and extent of aboriginal rights.
They should, however, serve to point out some of the issues that have been
decided, and not merely avoided, by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kruger
and Manuel v. The Queen. It is to be hoped that the Court will not view this
40

(1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150 at 152, 46 W.W.R. 65 at 66, [19641 2 C.C.C. 325

at 327.
41

Supra note 21, at 328 (S.C.R.), 156 (D.L.R.), 11 (W.W.R.).
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1d. at 346 (S.C.R.), 169 (D.L.R.), 25 (W.W.R.).

43

Supra note 32.

(1865), 11 H.L.C. 621.
45 S.S. 1967, c. 78, s. 6.
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decision as being determinative of the nature of aboriginal hunting rights,
but it is difficult to envisage it embarking upon a reasoned discussion of
the issues in the face of this judgment.
Having reached the conclusion that provincial game legislation does not
interfere with aboriginal rights, Mr. Justice Dickson was relieved of the problem of determining whether or not the accused had any aboriginal rights in
the Okanagan Valley. His subsequent comments with regard to aboriginal
rights may, therefore, be taken as obiter dicta, but should not go unnoted as
they are a clear articulation of the approach to aboriginal rights manifested
by the Court in this and other hunting cases discussed herein.
Clearly, the Supreme Court of Canada sees the question of aboriginal
rights as a constitutional question. Arising as they do, in the context of the
application of provincial laws to Indians, these cases cannot be characterized
in any other way. The thrust of the accused's argument is simply that provincial legislation that purports to abrogate aboriginal rights is ultra vires. It is
trite to say that the courts in this country are prepared to sit in judgment of the
constitutional validity of federal or provincial legislation whenever that question is put into issue by any private litigant engaged in the bona fide defence
or prosecution of his rights. While this state of affairs has come under some
criticism, notably by Paul Weiler, 46 the trend in the courts of late has been
to extend to individual citizens, in some circumstances, the right to challenge
the legislation even when no private right of the citizen is involved. 47
Nevertheless, Dickson J., in relation to aboriginal rights as a constitutional issue, made the following comments:
Before considering the two other grounds of appeal, I should say that the important
constitutional issue as to the nature of aboriginal title, if any, in respect of lands
in British Columbia, the further question as to whether it had been extinguished,
and the force of the Royal Proclamation of 1763-issues discussed in Calder v.
Attorney-General of B.C., [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d)
145-will not be determined in the present appeal. They were not directly placed
in issue by the appellants and a sound rule to follow is that questions of title
should only be decided when title is directly in issue. Interested parties should be
afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence in detail bearing upon the resolution
of the particular dispute. Claims to aboriginal title are woven with history, legend,
politics, and moral obligations. If the claim of any band in respect of any particular land is to be decided as a justiciable issue and not a political issue, it should
be considered on the facts pertinent to that band and to that land, not on any
global basis. Counsel were advised during argument-and indeed seemed to concede-that the issues raised in the present appeal could be resolved without determining the broader questions I have mentioned. 48

If the members of the Court had already expressed as their opinion that

aboriginal rights did not include the right to hunt, it is not surprising that they
might have conceded, at that point, that no aboriginal rights question remained.
Even so, the proposition that a private litigant cannot raise certain categories
of constitutional issues is a remarkable one. True, aboriginal rights may be
46p. Weiler, The Supreme Court and the Lmv of Canadian Federalism (1973), 23
U. of T. L. J. 307.
47 Thorson v. A.G. Can., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1; and Nova Scotia
Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265, (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 632.
48
Supra note 1, at 437 (D.L.R.), 303 (W.W.R.).
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characterized as tribal rights or communal rights, as opposed to individual
rights. It is, however, in the final analysis, individuals who will enjoy or lose
those rights. Further, the right of a province to legislate in any particular area
without interference by the federal government or vice-versa, cannot, in any
case, be characterized as a right appertaining to an individual. Private litigants
have the right to raise such questions because they are members of a collectivity. As long as individuals live under the rule of law, they must live under
the rule of all laws, and, in particular, the fundamental or constitutional law.
Clearly, the Supreme Court would like to see all aboriginal rights issues
settled at the political level and not brought before the courts. Of the three
cases discussed here, Kruger and Manuel is the most dramatic, but it is not
the only example of what appears to be a desperate effort to avoid discussion
of the nature or existence of aboriginal rights. This attempt at avoidance is,
however, illusory. In Derriksanv. The Queen and Kruger and Manuel v. The
Queen, in particular, the issue was avoided by simply saying that the right in
question is not an aboriginal right. That, in itself, is a statement of the nature
and extent of aboriginal rights, and one which, when examined in conjunction
with the traditions and lifestyle of Canada's native people, leaves the observer
wondering what remains of aboriginal rights, if anything.
In this particular case, having reached the conclusion that Indians do
not enjoy any right to hunt that does not derive from treaty or special legislation, the rest of the issues fall neatly into place.
Provincial laws of general application apply to Indians in the absence
of a treaty or federal enactment, whether or not section 88 of the Indian Act
states the existing constitutional law or simply incorporates provincial laws
into the Indian Act and gives them the force of federal law. Thus, this last
question, over which the Supreme Court remains divided, 49 was neatly avoided,
and the only remaining question was whether the Wildlife Act of British Columbia is a "law of general application." It is this question that takes up the
bulk of Mr. Justice Dickson's attention and is worthy of further comment in
itself. Suffice it to say here, however, that the discussion contained in the
judgment is superficial at best, and it is to be hoped that it is not the last
word on the subject from the Supreme Court. The reader, and the Court,
are referred to the judgment of the Divisional Court of Ontario in Four B
Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of Americau and, indeed,
the Court's own discussion of the question in Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare.51
One example will serve to show some of the internal problems with Mr.
Justice Dickson's comments on this question. Bearing in mind that he had
already held that no question on aboriginal rights arises, he went on to repeat
the proposition as follows:
Game conservation laws have as their policy the maintenance of wildlife resources.

It might be argued that without some conservation measures, the ability of Indians
or others to hunt for food would become a moot issue in consequence of the
49 NaturalParents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751, (1975),
60 D.L.R. (3d) 148, [1976] 1 W.W.R. 699.

50 (1977), 1 Can. Native Law Bull. 10 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
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destruction of the resource. The presumption is for the validity of a legislative
enactment and in this case the presumption has to mean that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary the measures taken by the British Columbia legislature
were taken to maintain an effective resource in the province for its citizens and
not to oppose the interests of conservationists and Indians in such a way as to
favour the claims of the former. If, of course, it can be shown in future litigation
that the province has acted in such a way as to oppose conservation and Indians'
claims to the detriment of the latter-to "preserve moose before Indians" in the
words of Gordon J.A. in Regina v. StrongquiW52-- it might very well be concluded
that the effect of the legislation is to cross the line demarking the laws of general
application from other enactments. It would have to be shown that the policy of
such an Act was to impair the status and capacities of Indians. Were that so,
section 88 would not operate to make the Act applicable to Indians. But that has
not been done here and in the absence of clear evidence the court cannot so
presume.53

This paragraph can only be read, it is suggested, as implying that Indians
have some right to hunt game that, at some point, will be immune from
provincial legislation. If such a right exists, and it does not exist by virtue of
any treaty or statute, it is difficult to conceive of its source if the source is not
aboriginal rights. Yet, that has already been rejected as a possibility by the
Supreme Court of Canada. Elsewhere, Dickson J. commented as follows:
However abundant the right of the Indians to hunt and to fish, there can be no
doubt that such right is subject to regulation and curtailment by the appropriate
legislative authority.5 4

What right, one may ask, beyond the right of any other citizen? The inconsistency of these comments is briefly acknowledged and, it seems, regrettably
dismissed:
It has been urged in argument that Indians having historic hunting rights which
they have not surrendered should not be placed in a more invidious position than
those who entered into treaties, the terms of which preserved those rights. However
receptive one may be to such an argument on compassionate grounds, the plain
fact is that section 88 of the Indian Act, enacted by the Parliament of Canada,
provides that "subject to the terms of any treaty" all laws of general application
from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of
Indians in the province, except as stated. The terms of the treaty are paramount;
in the absence of a treaty provincial laws of general application apply. 5
Given, as the Court said, that the result would be the same with or

without section 88 of the Indian Act, at least as far as hunting is concerned,
we have come full circle in the Supreme Court of Canada in less than a decade. From the high point in Calder v. The Attorney-General of British

Columbia, aboriginal rights have been reduced from rights to compassion.
In Kruger and Manuel, as in Frank,the Court seemed inclined to recognize the

rights that exist apart from statute and apart from treaty. That inclination,
in this case, leads to a confused and circuitous process of reasoning that not
only fails to articulate the nature of those rights, but also denies them any

legal significance within our constitutional structure.
52 [19531 2 D.L.R. 264, 8 W.W.R. (N.S.) 247, 105 C.C.C. 262 (Sask. C.A.).
53
Supra note 1, at 439-40 (D.L.R.), 306 (W.W.R.).
54 Id. at 439 (D.L.R.), 305 (W.W.R.).
55 Id. at 441 (D.L.R.), 308 (W.W.R.).

